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ANANKE IN HERODOTUS 
Abstract: This paper examines Herodotus' use of words of the avUYJCil family in order to determine which external or 
internal constraints the historian represents as affecting the causality of events. M. Ostwald's 'AvUYJCil in Thucydides 
( 1988) provides a foundation for examining the more restricted application of these terms in Herodotus (85 occurrences 
vs. 161 in Thucydides). In Herodotus, divine necessity (absent in Thucydides) refers to the predictable results of human 
wrongdoings more often than to a force constraining human choices. This represents an especially ambiguous 
Herodotean category, however, and is expressed by a wider range of terms than those with avaYJCil-stems. The analy-
sis of natural avaYJCil yields more clear-cut results. (I) In Herodotus (and not in Thucydides) avaYJCil often qualifies 
an aggressive compulsion applied by a personal agent. (2) Victims of this despotic avaYJCil are partially excused, but 
those who resist it earn Herodotus' praise. (3) Most importantly, Herodotus (unlike Thucydides) never in turn applies 
avaYJCll words to circumstances that motivate imperialistic actions, especially starting a war. (4) Whereas in 
Thucydides agents are 'compelled ' to act also by fear and other internal impulses, the only psychological factor to 
which Herodotus applies avUYJCil words (and this time mostly in a positive sense) is moral obligation. 
Herodotus' concept of avaYJCil is moralistic, and consistent with his unwillingness to justify imperialism, his prac-
tice of assigning responsibility, and his high regard for nomos, on the one hand, and freedom on the other. The nar-
rator's involvement in these principles is reflected in Herodotus' use of avaYJCil terms in self-referential statements of 
the type ' I am compelled/not compelled to say x.' These statements represent the narrator as the opposite of an imper-
ial subject and analogous to the most admirable of his characters on the receiving end of compulsion. He is a free 
agent, who disregards political pressure and is exclusively compelled by the rules that apply to him as researcher and 
truthful recorder. 
THE uses of words of the ava"flCTl family in the Greek historians illuminate issues of human 
responsibility and the causality of events. Martin Ostwald's analysis of avayK'J1 in Thucydides 
provides a wealth of comparative material for examining the concept in Herodotus.' The testi-
mony of Thucydides is important for the purpose of discussing Herodotus because both 
Thucydides himself and the speakers to whom he attributes the standard (i.e. 'necessary') argu-
ments give us the panorama of a whole contemporary political culture that tended to discuss poli-
cies and events in terms of what 'necessarily' produced them:2 factor A does not just lead to event 
B, but rather forces B. Herodotus, it turns out, is much more discriminating in adding avayK'J1 
to his explanations of causes.J I hope to show that the way in which Herodotus deals with the 
notion of necessity constitutes a response to the political discourse current in his and 
Thucydides' time. More specifically, Herodotus' avoidance of avaYK- is consistent with his 
intention to hold individuals and states responsible (or, as he would say, aitioi) for their actions. 
In focusing my study on Herodotus' use of ava"flCTl terms, I am aware of two concomitant 
methodological problems. The first is that such terms have a broad semantic field, depending on 
the factor that constitutes an avayK'J1, the specific event it forcibly causes, the parties which it 
affects and the circumstances under which it does so. We variously translate these terms with 
words related to compulsion, necessity, inevitability, requirement, or obligation.4 Keyne 
Cheshire has recently detected a semantic difference between the nouns avayK'J1 and aV<XYK<Xtr\ 
in Homer and Herodotus, arguing that 'ava"flCTl refers to more general or abstracted compulsion 
I Ostwald (1988). I thank Martin Ostwald, Donald 
Lateiner, Keyne Cheshire and the anonymous referees for 
JHS for reading previous versions of this paper and offer-
ing numerous suggestions, all extremely helpful. The
responsibility for all remaining errors is of course mine. 
2 Whatever one thinks about the historicity of
Thucydides' speeches (see Hornblower (1987) 45-72), ta 
deonta ( 1.22.1) guarantees at any rate the historicity of
the political code - types of arguments, word combina-
tions, etc. 
3 There are 161 occurrences of avaYK- in Thucy-




occurrences in Herodotus is based on Powell (1938) s.vv. 
I count 795 pages of (Oxford) text for Herodotus as 
opposed to 596 for Thucydides. 
4 ''AvaYJCil terms' include the nouns av<irlCTl and 
UVUYKai,, the adjective avaYKa'io~, the adverb avay-
Kaioo~, and the Verbs UVUYICU~OO, ErtaVUYICU~OO and 
e~avaYK<i~oo. See Lachenaud (1979) 95-6. The com-
pound 1tpocravaYK<i~oo, used by Thucydides, is absent 
from Herodotus. The noun avayKai11 occurs in 
Herodotus but not in Thucydides (see below and next 
note). 
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ANANKE IN HERODOTUS 31 
while aV<X"((C<Xt'l'\ denotes particular instances of it' .s All these meanings, however, refer to a situa-
tion in which something takes away or severely limits one's choice with respect to a course of action 
or state of affairs, overriding other considerations that would have made that choice desirable. 
Secondly, although ava"((C- terms are particularly strong, they are not the only signals of a situ-
ation of constraint. We will need therefore to monitor the uses of expressions with XPll, 0£1, 
JlEAAW, and so on, as well as being alert to any cases when necessity is emphasized by the way 
circumstances are described, rather than named with a particular term. 
There are two important uses of ava"((CTT terms that we never find in Thucydides. One of 
these is attested in Herodotus, the other probably so. The first is the occurrence of these words 
in self-referential metanarrative, when the narrator (i.e. Herodotus) occasionally introduces or 
dismisses a topic by saying that he is compelled or not compelled to include certain information 
in his account. This use of the stem avayK- is fundamental to the way in which Herodotus rep-
resents his position vis-a-vis his audience in comparison with the position in which the charac-
ters of his history find themselves in particular cases. It occurs, however, at a different level of 
di.scourse from all the other uses. We will therefore discuss it last, after exploring the evidence 
in the narrative. 
The second type of ava"((CTT that we do not find in Thucydides is that which derives from a 
higher agency, be it cosmic or divine.6 In Herodotus' work, which accumulates evidence of 
divine intervention in human affairs, we would also expect that ava"((CTT terms would occasion-
ally express the idea that certain actions and events are ultimately made inevitable by the gods. 
Since what constitutes divine predetermination is one of the most ambivalent areas of 
Herodotean thought, we will start by considering this transcendent avayK'l'\. We will then pro-
ceed to examine other agents or causes of compulsion, also focusing on the means through which 
it becomes operative, the results it produces, and the status of those on the receiving end. 
Transcendent necessity 
In this section we want to determine whether avayK'l'\ words in the Histories ever denote a neces-
sity imposed by the divine; if so, what sort of necessities does the divine impose, whether it 
forces human actions or their results, and according to what criteria. Though no statement in the 
Histories explicitly attributes avayK'l'\ to the divine, four passages refer to a compulsion that is 
less clearly due only to natural causes: the first is a narrative of events earlier predicted by an 
oracle and the remaining three are oracular utterances. Before examining these cases, we should 
remember that generally in Herodotus the divine intervenes in human affairs either by helping to 
cause certain effects or by communicating - through oracles, dreams and other signs - that cer-
tain effects will take place. The two modes of intervention, however, are largely autonomous: a 
divine prophecy that something will happen or even that it is bound to happen indicates unerr-
ing divine foreknowledge of the event, but not necessarily that the divine will be its cause. 7 
A band of armoured Ionian and Carian sea-raiders are sailing in search of plunder when 
'necessity constrains them' to land in Egypt, where they eventually help Psammetichus to regain 
the throne (2.152.4-5). This concrete necessity (avayK<Xt'l'\, rather than avayK'l'\) has presumably 
natural causes.s But the forced arrival of these foreigners fulfils a previous oracle that the exiled 
Psammetichus would obtain revenge upon his royal colleagues 'through bronze men appearing 
s I am grateful to K. Cheshire for making available to 
me a copy of his paper 'The semantic differences of 
avc:iYKTI and avayx:ai11 in Homer and Herodotus', deliv-
ered at the 1998 APA meeting in Chicago, as well as a 
manuscript copy of his article with the same title. 
6 Ostwald (1988) 19, 33. 
7 For this distinction, see Munson (2001). On the 
truthfulness of oracles, see narrator's generalization at 
8.77. The problem of divine necessity is part of the 
broader issues of the 'fatalistic' strain in Herodotus and 
his use of oracles, on which more work needs to be done. 
See Kirchberg (1965), Fomara (1990) and now Harrison 
(2000) 122-57. 
8 See above, n.5. At 2.152.4 a7tevnx6i)vat suggests 
that the ships were forced to put to land by bad weather 
(cf 2.114.2). 
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32 ROSARIA VIGNOLO MUNSON 
from the sea' (2.152.3). If there is a higher level of causality for the event, the purpose of the 
divine constraint must be the fulfilment of a plan in the terms formulated by the oracle: the gods 
wanted Psammetichus to get his revenge ('ticrt~).9 
In three prophetic utterances that express themselves in terms of an &va"flCTl that something 
happen, the necessity could itself be divine.1o At 7.140.2-3* the Pythia describes to the 
Athenians blood dripping from the roofbeams of Greek temples in anticipation of the 'con-
straints of evil' ( K<XK6-tll'tO~ &vayKat) entailed by Xerxes' invasion. Here K<XKO'tll~ may be active 
(malice) or passive (misfortune); if passive, the misfortune may belong to the Greeks or to the 
Persians. The genitive may be subjective (malice or misfortune causing con·straints) or objective 
(someone or something forcibly causing malice or misfortune).u The ambiguities are important 
because they raise the problem of the extent to which the Histories represent the Persian inva-
sion of Greece and other acts of aggression as free human choices. 
(1) If the phrase K<XKO'tlltO~ &vayKat means 'inevitable malice', then the initiative of Xerxes' 
invasion would constitute a necessity, and this necessity may originate from the divine (i.e. the 
gods have forced him to make the expedition). The plural &vayKat, however, seems rather to 
refer to the concrete results of the compulsion. 12 The other possible interpretations, therefore, 
are all more satisfactory than this one. Two of them point to a human agent as cause. (2) The 
'inevitabilities of malice' are caused to either party by the malice of Xerxes, and (3) the 'con-
straints of misfortunes' which weigh upon everyone and especially the Greeks (who are, after all, 
the recipients of the oracle) are produced by Xerxes. 
The divine is only relevant again if the oracle is also predicting that Xerxes the individual will 
be on the receiving end of divine &vayK<Xt. (4) The transcendent 'inevitable misfortune' would 
be Xerxes' defeat, an ethically predictable consequence of his immoral actionD. The necessity is 
that of retribution, somewhat as in the case of Psammetichus considered earlier. (5) Similarly, 
the 'necessities deriving from (Xerxes') malice' are imposed by the gods according to a causal 
or conditional pattern: if/when/since x happens, y will necessarily happen. This resembles the 
explicit conditional formulation of another prophetic utterance with &vayK- (4.179.3): when a 
descendant of the Argo's company carries off Jason's tripod from Triton's temple, it is inevitably 
decreed that one hundred Greek cities be built on the shores of Lake Triton. Here the ethical 
motivations of the necessity are less clear than in Xerxes' case.14 But, at any rate, the oracle pre-
dicts the necessity not in an absolute sense, but as something that is either concomitant with or 
results from a (presumably not inevitable) human action. 
The last prophecy with avayK- concerns once again the Persian invasion of Greece. This 
time a human speaker, an anonymous Persian, communicates his premonitions to a Greek sym-
posiast: 'Stranger, what must (OEt) happen from god is impossible for man to avoid, for no one 
wants to listen to those who say reliable things. Though a few of us Persians are aware of these 
things, we still follow, constrained by necessity (&vayK<Xtllt evOEOEJ..tevot). This is the worst sor-
9 Possibly divine storms occur at 7.188-91 and 8.12-
13. Necessity of divine retribution constitutes one of the 
few principles which the narrator of the Histories 
expresses by a generalized statement in his own voice 
(2.120.5). Harrison (2000) I 02-21 . 
10 4.179.3, 7.140.2-3*, 9.16.4-5*. In an additional 
occurrence of civaYKTl in an oracle ( 1.67 .4 *), the necessi-
ty is due to mechanical human agency. I follow Powell 
(1938) in marking '*' passages in direct speech. 
11 Grene's translation (1987) maintains these ambigu-
ities: 'an evil sheerly constraining'. But see de Selincourt, 
revised by Marincola (1996): 'woe that needs must.come'; 
see Waterfield's translation (Dewald (1998)): 'straits of 
woe' . 
12 Cheshire ( 1998) argues that civa"(K<Xtll in the sin-
gular always refers to a specific compulsion; ' but in order 
to particularize civaYKTl so that it refers to the application 
of compulsion, Herodotus pluralises the word' . 
13 The point is formulated by Themistocles at 
8.109.3*. For the similarities of the Greek concept of 
morality to our own, see Williams ( 1993) 1-20. I use the 
word 'immoral' to denote all actions that in the ethical 
code of the Histories are, or would be, called &ouca (cf 
1.5.3). 
14 On the uncertain meaning of Triton's alleged 
prophecy, see Corcella (1993) 367. 
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row for men, to know much and have no power' (9.16.5*). What 'must happen from god' is the 
Persian defeat at Plataea. The event is god-willed and inevitable not in an absolute way, but sim-
ply because (yap) those in power do not listen to the wise who would prevent the immoral beha-
viour upon which divine retribution will necessarily follow.1s The aV<X"((C<XtT\ by which the few 
wise but powerless Persians are constrained is in a sense identical with this transcendent neces-
sity: they, too, with the rest of the army, will be unable to escape the god-willed disaster (see 
9 .16.3 *). At a more immediate level of meaning, however, av<X"((C<XtT\ is also the compulsion 
applied by the despotic ruler who forces people to go along with his self-destructive enterprise. 
Just as in the Delphic oracle we have already discussed, Xerxes' aggression causes inevitable 
misfortune (interpretation 3), so here Xerxes' Persian subjects are compelled to a service which 
will in tum cause their misfortune. 
Thus, in all four passages where an civ<irKTl word may imply the idea of divine predisposi-
tion, the necessity is more likely to be the result than a mysterious cause of a human action. 
Three times out of four the god-willed result is ethically rational in the sense that it represents 
'tt<Jt~ . The two cases involving Xerxes, however, also encapsulate a different, non-transcendent 
meaning of civ<irKTl which, as we shall see in a later section, is most prominent in the Histories 
as a whole - the compulsion exercised on others by a monarchical ruler. 
Transcendent pre-determination with xpfl/5ei and JLH.A.m 
Since in the passage we have just discussed a speaker maintains that certain things 'must (OEt) 
happen from god', we must consider whether there are other passages in the Histories which pos-
sibly allude to divine necessity with OEt or other expressions. 16 In such cases we wish to verify, 
once again, the extent to which divine necessity constrains human choices or whether it responds 
and adapts to these choices. Close to the utterance of the anonymous Persian at 9.16.5*, for 
example, is the reported gnome of Amasis who, upon hearing that Polycrates had found the ring 
he had deliberately thrown into the sea, 'understood that it was impossible for a man to rescue 
another man from what was going to happen (eK 'tou flEAAov'to~ yivEcr6m 7tPTl'YJ1<X'to~) and that 
Polycrates was not going to end up well (ouK Ei> 'tEAEu~crnv JlEAAot), being so lucky in every-
thing that he even found what he threw away' (3.43.1). Amasis is apparently referring to a supe-
rior force that rules the destiny of men. He conceives of this force in amoral terms, as something 
that strikes men down not because they act unjustly, but because they are excessively fortunate. 
A similar conception emerges from Solon's notion of divine envy and, mutatis mutandis, from 
Artabanus' statement that the divine maintains a cosmic balance by striking down what is too big.11 
Some statements that a specific historical event must happen (with xpi)/xpE6v and OEt) come 
from divine prophecies. These are all but one in oratio obliqua1s and represent a weaker version 
of those oracles we have already seen that use an civ<i'YKTl term to predict a necessity that may or 
may not be itself divine.19 Interesting for our purposes, therefore, are only those oracles that say 
that something bad is or was bound to happen, implying that the human behaviour that caused it 
occurred precisely for the sake of producing that result, so that this behaviour itself appears to 
be inevitable. 
IS Sophie overlaps with moral righteousness in the case 
of 'wise advisers ' . See Lattimore (1939); Dewald (1985). 
16 See Hohti (1975). 
17 1.32.1 * (Solon); 7.10.e*, cf 7.46.3* (Artabanus). 
The narrator does not necessarily support these exact 
views, but my concern here is to examine all the different 
evidence Herodotus presents, including the opinions of
his characters. 
18 Hohti (1975) 32, who does not mention the excep-
tion at 7.17.2* 
19 1.120.1: xpflv that Cyrus become king. 2.55.2: 
 
xpe6v that an oracle of Zeus rise in Dodona. 7 .6.4: xpe6v 
that Xerxes invade Greece. 8.53.1: eOet that Attica fall to 
the Persians. 7.141.1: xpflcrat that the Acropolis survive 
and 7.142.3: od that the Athenians be defeated in a naval 
battle (misinterpretations). 8.141.1: xpe6v that the 
Spartans and the other Dorians be expelled from the 
Peloponnese by Medes and Athenians (unfulfilled). 
8.62.2* : Oe'iv that the Athenians colonize Siris (fulfilled 
in the extra-textual future) . See also 9.42.3*, cited below, 
n.24. For ~AM> in prophecies in indirect speech, see 
1.45.2*, 1.108.2, etc. 
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After Marathon, Miltiades makes an expedition against Paros which the text represents as 
unjustified ( 6.133 .I). In the course of this expedition he desecrates the local temple of Demeter 
with the collaboration of one of the priestesses; the outcome is that Miltiades gets wounded, fails 
in the expedition and ends up entangled in legal and political trouble until he dies of gangrene. 
The Delphic oracle forbids the Parians to discipline the corrupt priestess on the grounds that she 
was not responsible for these things and she simply appeared to Miltiades as a guide of wrong-
doings/misfortunes (JCmcci). For, the oracle says, he was bound to end up badly: Oetv yap 
MtA.ttciow teA.eutiiv flil d) (6.135.3). Here the necessity is clearly transcendent, but the priest-
ess' wrongdoing is not a divine entrapment which pushes an innocent man to commit a crime. It 
rather serves to direct his criminal behaviour (represented by his aggression against Paros) to the 
sphere of religion and cult, and this triggers his doom. 
The general pattern established by the oracular interpretation of Miltiades' career (wrongdo-
ing, inevitability of punishment, final trigger for the punishment), is elsewhere confirmed by the 
narrator's 'anticipations of doom', which retrospectively interpret an action as occurring because 
the agent 'was bound to end up badly' . Thus, Apries was one of the luckiest Egyptian kings, 
who invaded Sidon and fought against Tyre;2o then, 'since things were bound to turn out badly 
for him' (ertdte £oee oi JCaJCoo<; yev£cr9m), the trigger (rtpo<pacrt<;) is his unsuccessful expedition 
against Cyrene as a result of which he lost his throne (2.161.3).21 Similarly, Scyles leads an 
abnormal double-life for a Scythian king before he decides to become initiated in the rites of 
Dionysus, which the Scythians abhor. This culminating action must have been due to the fact 
that 'things were bound to turn out badly for him', interprets the narrator, and is indeed the 
rtpo<pacrt<; for his doing so (4.79.1). Both for Apries and Scyles the bad end and the self-detri-
mental behaviour that immediately causes it may be pre-determined by a higher external force.22 
Such necessities, however, represent a predictable response to previous, not inevitable, human 
choices.23 
In another famous case, that of Candaules, the initial ethical reason for the agent's downfall 
emerges from the insistence in the narrative on his abnormal state of mind ('This Candaules was 
seized by love for his wife, and being in love with her ... '). The single action that led to his death, 
his request that his servant Gyges contrive to see his wife naked, is then explained as due to the 
necessity that Candaules end up badly ( 1.8.1-2). It is perhaps significant that the gloss here uses 
not Oet, as in the instances we have seen so far, but XPTt. This points to a more internal necessi-
ty, the individual predisposition of Candaules, his ethos synonymous with 'fate' .24 
20 In Herodotus great good fortune carries connota-
tions of imminent unethical behaviour, due to overconfi-
dence or other psychological impulses (see e.g. the inter-
pretive gloss at 1.36.1 ). Hence, it is a sign of impending 
doom: Lateiner ( 1982). 
21 On prophasis in Herodotus and other texts, see 
Pearson (1952) and Rawlings (1975). There is no reason 
to devalue this type of interpretive gloss in Herodotus, 
pace Gould (1989) 73-90, esp. 77. 
22 The divine element is emphasized in the narrative 
of Scyles, where a god hurls a thunderbolt that destroys 
his luxurious 'Greek' town-house just before his initia-
tion. The interpretation of a natural (obligatory) causal-
ity, on the other hand, is suggested to the narrator by the 
earlier experience of Anacharsis recounted just above 
(4.76), as Hohti (1975) 34 correctly saw. In the case of 
Apries, the narrator's anticipation of doom with oe'i at 
2.161.3 dovetails with the oracle reported in the fuller 
version of the story at 5.159. 
23 See also the gloss of anticipation of doom concern-
ing Artaynte at 9.109.2 (though with no sign that the 
necessity is divine in this case). For j.LOtpa as the 
inevitable consequence of someone's action, see 1.91.1 *-
2*, 4.164.4 and, arguably, 1.121* and 3.142.3*, though 
not llOP<Jtj.Lov at 3.154.1 Less remarkable for what the 
text communicates about the way in which divine neces-
sity works are those cases where the narrator or a speak-
er interprets a set of circumstances (rather than a human 
action) as meaning that something that happened was in 
fact bound to happen. See 5.33 .2 (the only gloss with oe'i 
in the negative: the emphasis is here on 'this expedition', 
with allusion to a later occasion outside of the chrono-
logical range of the Histories) and 5.92dl * (the only 
gloss of this sort in an intradiegetic narrative). The gloss 
at 6.64 points to the inevitability of logical consequences 
rather than divine necessity. 
24 See Benardete (1965), especially 285 and 290-5. I 
owe this reference as well as an enhanced understanding 
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Predisposition may also play a role in the prophecy in direct speech at 7.17 .2 *. Here a dream 
which has already warned Xerxes about 'what he must suffer' (ta oci 1ta8e'iv) if he cancels his 
plan to march against Greece, also threatens Artabanus with punishment if he attempts to pre-
vent 'what is supposed to happen' (to xpeov yev£cr8m). To xpeov yev£cr8at is the expedition 
itself; ta oe'i 1ta8e'iv is the fact of Xerxes' becoming smaller if he does not undertake it (see 
7.14 *). Both expressions indicate some sort of necessity, but while oe'i refers only to the impo-
sition of an outcome as if from the outside, xpe6v may rather allude to a behaviour that is made 
'obligatory' by immanent causes, being the sort of action that this Persian king and his adviser, 
with their particular social, historical or personal backgrounds, are expected to do. 
The expression to xpeov yev£cr8at of the dream also resembles those paraphrases of oracular 
prescriptions (as opposed to predictions) that people do such and such a thing so as to bring about 
certain results. In two cases of this type the result is undesirable and fixed, but the agent declines 
to cooperate as he 'should' in bringing it about with his own wrong-doings.2s Egypt must suffer 
one hundred and fifty years of misery (2.133.3: external necessity, possibly divine, with oci), but 
Mycerinus has not done what he was 'bound' or expected to do (to xpeov 1tOt£Etv) for this plan 
entirely to succeed. Similarly, Ethiopian rule in Egypt must only last fifty years (2.139.3, oeot), 
but the Ethiopian king rejects the vision's command to do something unholy to bring it to an end. 
Divine prescriptions as such, in other words, do not eliminate the agent's freedom to decide as he 
wishes. To be sure, for Mycerinus and the Ethiopian king the trade-off is respectively death and 
renouncing power. In the case of Xerxes, moreover, the vision promises him a rapid decline into 
insignificance if he does not march against Greece, without at the same time making him aware 
that the expedition will fail. The dream forces his decision, and dreams in Herodotus are gener-
ally divine.26 The reasons why god would force an action which is both immoral and unwise, and 
why he would do so precisely in order to produce the agent's failure may have to do with the pun-
ishment of evil intentions, as in the case ofGlaucus (6.86a-o), or with the cosmic balance or divine 
envy to which, as we have mentioned, various characters refer; or, given the variable timing of 
divine retribution, they may derive from the guilt of Xerxes' predecessors, in the same way as the 
J.I.Otpa of Croesus was at one level caused by the guilt of Gyges (1.91.1 *). These reasons are, at 
any rate, less clearly formulated and less ethically predictable- and therefore the outcomes are less 
avoidable- than in those cases when an agent's failure appears to be the necessary punishment of 
his own wrongdoing. 
In this and in the preceding section we have seen that when the narrator, a character, an oracle, 
or a dream says, or possibly means to say, that something is bound to happen because god will make 
it happen, this divine necessity tends to concern the ethically rational result of a non-necessary and 
culpable human action rather than inexplicably causing men to behave in a certain way. We should 
not, of course, minimize the importance of cases that we have found to be ambiguous. They are, 
after all, representative of the overall uncertainty that emerges from the speculations of different 
characters about the intentions and actions of the gods and from the special caution the narrator 
himself exercises in this sphere.21 But in proportion to the sustained interest the Histories demon-
strate in the work of the divine, the instances where they represent it as constraining human choice 
are infrequent. This is in itself remarkable, and consistent with the complex, but more clearly defin-
of the case of Candaules to discussions with M. Ostwald. 
See also Williams (1993) 136 for ethos as fate in relation 
to divine necessity in Greek tragedy. At 9.42.3*, 
Mardonius paraphrases an oracle predicting that an 
invading army is bound to plunder the temple of Delphi 
C~:pe6v), and will all perish after the deed. Here 'is 
bound' perhaps means not so much that it will or that it is 
'fated' to do so, but that this is the way an invading army 
(be it Persian or Illyrian: see 9.43.2) is inclined to behave. 
25 Contrast 5.89.3 (cf 5.89.2), where the Athenians 
decline to do what an oracle says they 'should' (xpe6v), 
thereby forgoing desirable results. For similar paraphras-
es of oracles with xpf, /OEt see e.g. 5.79.2* (oe'i), and cf 
1.39.2* (xpi)v), the last an incorrect interpretation. 
26 See Frisch (1968). For the divine origin of this 
particular dream, see Solmsen (1974) 148-57. Its natura-
listic aspect will become relevant below, p. 43. 
27 See especially 9.65.2, 2.3.2, 7.129.4. 
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able role Herodotus attributes to natural necessity of different types. The latter represents the most 
important focus of our discussion. We shall now turn to it, concentrating on the use of words in the 
av&"fKTT family, though we will monitor the uses of other terms, for the most part in the footnotes. 
Human agents of compulsion 
In Herodotus the most pervasive overarching cause of compulsion, which appears in over half 
the total number of occurrences of av&yKTl terms, is represented by specific human agents.2s 
These are, in most cases, individuals who rely on their political or military power, especially 
kings, tyrants and their representatives or other despotic types.29 Gyges is compelled by the 
queen to choose between killing Candaules or dying himself;Jo the cowherd is compelled by 
Astyages' minister to expose the infant Cyrus (1.112.2*); Prexaspes is compelled by Cambyses 
to kill Smerdis (3.75.2). Deioces compels the Medes to build Ecbatana (1.98.3), and conquered 
men are compelled by Sesostris to dig canals (2.1 08.2). Darius compels Sataspes to circumna-
vigate Libya (4.43.3). 
Cyrus' general Mazares compels the Lydians to change their material culture (1.157.2), and 
Amyntas is compelled by Darius' ambassadors to have his women-folk sit with the male guests 
at a banquet ( 5 .18.5). Other violations of nomos occur when Artabanus is compelled by Xerxes 
to masquerade as king and sit on his throne for the purpose of testing the dream (7 .16.1, rein-
forced by ~e'i at 7.16y3*), and when Xerxes' guards try to force the Spartan heralds Sperthias and 
Boulis to comply with Persian custom and prostrate themselves in the presence of the king 
(7.136.1). 
Astyages compels the herdsman Mitradates to tell the truth about Cyrus ( 1.116.4 and 5); 
Croesus is compelled to answer Cyrus' questions (1.86.4) and Demaratus is compelled by the 
king to give his opinion (7.104.1 *, 5*). 
The Thracians, Thessalians and other Greeks surrender to Xerxes under compulsion and 
many, including the Ionians, are compelled to participate in his expedition (7.108.1, 110, 132.2, 
172.1, 8.22.2*, 9.17.1 ); the Peloponnesians risked a similar fate (7.139.3). The king's armies go 
to war compelled by the whip (7 .1 03.4 *).31 Aeginetan ships are seized under compulsion by the 
Spartan king Cleomenes for the purposes of his expedition against Argos (6.92.1). The Greek 
tyrant Micythus compels Rhegium to support Tarentum against Iapygians and Messapians, there-
by losing 3000 men in the worst slaughter of Greeks that ever occurred (7.170.3). 
In all these cases compulsion is intentional and accomplished by force. In Thucydides some-
one may compel another to do something simply by going about his own business, or one may 
manipulate av&yKTl by strategy. But in Herodotus personal compulsion tends to be both target-
ed and brutal.32 In the passage where Mitradates is forced to reveal what he knows about the 
28 45 cases. For xpi] in reference to obligation 
imposed by a human agent, see 1.69.1 (Croesus), 1.88.2* 
(Cyrus), 1.108.5* (Astyages), 3.20.1 (Cambyses), 4.9.4 
(Heracles), 7.8.01 * (Xerxes), 7.52.2* (Xerxes, but 
through circumstances and personal interest), 7.160.2* 
(Gelon), 8.75.1 (Themistocles), 8.1 00.5* (Xerxes). For 
oe'i, see 1.11.2* and 3* (queen), 1.42.2* (Croesus, but 
also moral obligation), 1.109.4* his (Astyages), 7.8.01 *, 
7.16.y3*, 7.23.3 (Xerxes), 8.6.2 (Persians), 7.51.2* 
(Xerxes, for first part of Ionians' choice), 8.80.1 * 
(Themistocles), 9.33.5 (Tisamenus vs. Spartans). 
29 35 cases. The instances where this does not pro-
perly apply include: Darius (not yet king) compelling the 
conspirators to kill the false Smerdis immediately 
(3 .72.1 *); the Greeks cannot compel the Thessalians to 
fight the Persians alone (7.172.3* twice); the Thebans 
have come to Thermopylae compelled by the Greeks 
(7 .233 .I); Hermotimus compels Panionios and sons to 
castrate each other (8.1 06.4, three times); Theran 
colonists are compelled to sail back to Libya by their fel-
low-citizens (4.156.3); princess-turned-prostitute com-
pels her clients to reveal secrets about their lives 
(2.12le2); Solon leaves to prevent the Athenians from 
compelling him to revoke his laws ( 1.29.1; but see below, 
p. 45). 
3o 1.11.3, 4. For the proliferation of avc:xyx:- and oe'i 
in this episode, see below n.80. 
31 At 8.130.2 no one compels the Persian!Phoenician 
fleet to advance west of Samos. This may mean that no 
orders came from the king, or that the enemy's strategy 
did not require the Persians to do anything in particular. 
32 See Ostwald (1988) 13 for aVaYJCll produced by 
strategy in Thucydides. In Herodotus, with the possible 
partial exception of the negative statement cited in the 
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child Cyrus, the plural ava"(l(at really means torture ( 1.116.4 and 5). Sperthias and Boulis must 
endure their heads being physically pushed to the ground (7 .136.1 ), and in the narrative of the 
Persian occupation of Caria, avaYJCll is contrasted with 'voluntary' surrender and must indicate 
either military occupation or immediate threat of an attack (6.25.2). 
As the list given above also shows, the actions a despotic agent compels others to do are 
almost always undesirable for the compelled party because immoral, culturally inappropriate, 
self-detrimental, physically arduous, or dangerous.33 The avayKT\ itself tends to have negative 
moral connotations in both directions. In Thucydides, for example, commanders may face an 
emergency by compelling their troops to perform unpleasant tasks without these cases signify-
ing the high-handedness of the one or a loss of dignity for the other.34 In Herodotus, by contrast, 
avaY1C'l is used to describe conquest or an overbearing exercise of power.3s To be subject to avaY1C'l 
may represent an extenuating circumstance of bad behaviour,36 but only up to a point37; it is also 
tantamount to slavery and a reason for contempt (7.11 0-111.1, 7.99.1, 7.96.1-2). To disregard per-
sonal avaylCT\ is worthy of praise. Artemisia, who acts independently of it, is called a thoma 
(7.99.1). Sperthias and Boulis, who resist heroically, are described in the same terms (7.135-6). 
Unlike Herodotus, Thucydides is unimpressed by stubborn resistance to avayKT\ even when 
he uses the word in a way that corresponds somewhat to Herodotus' 'monarchical avayKT\ ', to 
refer to a power exercising imperialistic compulsion over a weaker party. Both Athenians and 
Peloponnesians forcibly exact tribute, military service, war contributions or allegiance from 
actual or potential subjects and allies.3s Within city-states in a situation of stasis, one faction may 
impose measures over another by avayKT\.39 In Herodotus, however, the relentless attribution of 
avayKT\ to despots colours the term with an intense moralism absent from Thucydides and makes 
one case in which it is imposed by Greeks on other Greeks particularly meaningful. 
At 8.111 .2 Themistocles, who after Salamis exacts contributions from the islanders, presents 
himself to the Andrians declaring that the Athenians are assisted by two powerful goddesses, 
Peitho (Persuasion), and Anankaie.4o This passage helps to clarify beyond a shadow of a doubt 
the political meaning of historical kings and tyrants in Herodotus as paradigms for contemporary 
abuses of power by Greek leaders or leading Greek city-states.41 The way in which Themistocles 
objectifies and divinizes the concept of imperialistic compulsion recalls the Athenians in 
Thucydides, who justify their aggression of the Melians in 416 BC on the basis of a cosmic law 
perhaps governing gods as well as men (Thuc. 5.105.1-3). Themistocles' rhetorical pairing of 
persuasion and avayKatT\ is analogous to the combination of Athenian compulsion and 'persuasion' 
note above and the never implemented plan by which the 
Carians would have compelled themselves to be more 
courageous by fighting with the river behind them 
(5.118.2), strategy is never said to compel anyone to do 
something. So for example, the Syracusans compel the 
Athenians to fight in their harbour (Thuc. 7 .51.1 ); but in 
a somewhat parallel passage in Herodotus, where 
Themistocles makes the Persians fight in the narrows 
(Hdt. 8.75-83), no ava:yK- stem is to be found (only oe'i 
at 8.80.1 *). Aside from this case, no one in Herodotus 
must ever do something with XPlJ and oei because of 
someone else's strategy. The exception points to 
Themistocles' high-handed methods vis-a-vis his fellow-
Greeks. See Munson (1988) 98 and 101 , and below pp. 
37-8. 
33 The only two exceptions occur at 8.140a2* and 
6.42.1-2. 
34 E.g. Thuc. 8.24.2. Ostwald (1988) 11-12. 
35 See 8.130.2 (in a negative statement) for an excep-
tion. 
36 Only Greek states who medized 'without compul-
sion' will be held accountable by the other Greeks 
(7.132.3). The Thebans at Thermopylae claim that, since 
they have joined the Greeks under compulsion, they are 
guiltless (avainot) toward the king (7.233.1 ). See also 
8.22.2* (cf Thuc. 3.39.2*). 
37 1.13.2 and 91.1; 6.92.1. 
38 The compelling agent is Athens at Thuc. 1.99 .1 
(where Williams (1993) 105 notices the 'sinister plural '), 
3.90.3, 6.88.5, 8.76.4, 5.84.2. On the Peloponnesian side, 
see Thuc. 1.107.2, 3.61.2*, 3.39.2*, 5.31.3, 6.91.4*, 
7 .18.4, 8.3.1. 
39 3.71.1 , 4.74.3, 8.38.3, 8.76.6. Ostwald (1988) 12-14. 
40 For the other two cases of avaYJCll imposed by 
Greeks (7.172.3* and 7.233.1), see n.44. 
41 For the thesis that Herodotus uses the past as a 
vehicle for speaking about the present, see especially 
Fomara (1971) 37-93 and (1981), followed by Raaflaub 
( 1987), Stadter ( 1992), Moles ( 1996), all ultimately 
indebted to Strasburger (1955). 
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of the Melians in Thucydides (see especially 5.84.2 and 5.98).42 This says nothing about the rel-
ative date of composition of the two passages, but certainly reflects contemporary political dis-
course. Their emphasis is different, however. In Thucydides the Athenian aggression against a 
little island marks the culmination of the objective constraints upon the weak (and of the psy-
chological pressure upon the powerful) imposed by war. Herodotus, on the other hand, uses his 
case to show an abrupt and gratuitous reversal from Xerxes to Athens as the agent of compul-
sion against the Greek states or, in other words, a transition from the literal to a metaphorical 
meaning of monarchical compulsion.43 
The responses to Athenian demands by Andrians and Melians respectively also illustrate the 
two authors' different views of the victims of <iva:yKll . The Melian argument that the Athenian 
aggression is immoral and ultimately self-detrimental is in the best archaic tradition and resem-
bles an adjourned theorization of Herodotus' political message throughout his work. But in the 
context of the history of Thucydides, the Melians ' choice appears self-destructive and naive. 
Herodotus' Andrians, by contrast, provide no lengthy philosophical argument, only a brisk repar-
tee designed to show the practical limits to a superpower's ability to impose <iv6.yK11 upon oth-
ers on its preferred terms. Congratulations to the Athenians for their two powerful goddesses; 
the Andrians themselves can only count on two useless divinities, Poverty (IlEViT\) and 
Helplessness ('AJ.I.T\X<XVtT\); and there is no way that the power (OUV<XJ.I.tc;) of the Athenians could 
be stronger than their own powerlessness (<iouvacrif\).44 With this answer they give no money 
and are put under siege. The result is the same as for the Melians but, albeit without show of 
heroism, Herodotus' Andrians join the exalted company of Sperthias and Boulis and others who 
resist or shrug off despotic <iv6.y1C11. 
Non-personal causes of compulsion: 
factors of the physical world, external circumstances and human emotions 
Because of the prominence of description in his work Herodotus, unlike Thucydides, has the 
opportunity to mention natural laws and geographical features . He occasionally applies <iv6.M 
words to these phenomena, not because they specifically affect the characters in his historical 
narrative, but in order to emphasize their predictability and the logical deductions a scientist can 
draw from them. 45 His appeals to a physical necessity finds close parallels in the discourse of 
the Hippocratic medical writers. 46 
Herodotus' interest in boundaries, including metaphorical ones, may account for those cases 
where he refers to the potential <iv6.M, should one wish to go from point A to point B, of cross-
42 The parallelism has long since been noticed. See 
Immerwahr (1966) 200 and his n.29. 
43 Cf the allusion to a reversal from Persian to 
Athenian domination in Herodotus at 7.11 0, where the 
Thracians are compelled by Xerxes, all except the Satrai, 
who 'continue to be free still in my time, alone among the 
Thracians'. At the time of narration the Thracians, 
except for the Satrai, are subject to Athens just as they 
were then compelled by Xerxes. Compare the possible 
implicit parallel between Persian and Athenian tribute at 
6.42.2, though the meaning of this passage is controver-
sial : see Stadter (1992) 797-8 and n.41. 
44 8.111.2-3. At 7.172.2-3*, a similar response is pro-
vided under very different circumstances by the 
Thessalians to the confederate Greeks: ' If you do not 
want to come to our aid, you are in no position to apply 
avayKai'l] on us [and make us resist the Persians by our-
selves] ; for never has avayK'I] been stronger than power-
lessness (aouvacrifl)'. Here the avayKai'l] applied by the 
Greeks on the Thessalians may be that of moral obliga-
tion (see below, p.44 and n.76); it is at any rate bound to 
be weaker than their powerlessness vis-a-vis the compul-
sion applied by Xerxes (cf 7.172.1). The irony of com-
peting constraints also occurs at 7.233.1-2, where the 
Thebans, who have been fighting against the Persians at 
Thermopylae tnt' avayKatfl~ (i.e. compelled by the 
Greeks, presumably by force), surrender to the king and 
are immediately branded as (his) slaves. 
45 Herodotus appeals to scientific avayK'I] in his dis-
cussion of the flood of the Nile (2.22.3; cf 2.22.4). See 
also the contrary to fact conditions at 2.20.3 (scientific 
necessity with xpftv based on logical reasoning) and 
2.15.2 (purely logical necessity with eoet). 
46 See Lloyd (1987) 119-23 on 'dogmatic ananke' in 
the Hippocratics, especially in the first four chapters of 
Diseases I. On the Hippocratics and Herodotus, see 
Lateiner (1986); Thomas (1997) and (2000) 168-212 and 
221; C. Pelling, 'Causes, scientific and other: 
Hippocratics and historians' (forthcoming). 
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ing rivers and other obstacles: everyone, not only conquerers but also road-builders and innocent 
tourists, must come to terms with the natural lay of the land.47 Two or three times in the histor-
ical narrative natural forces and geography constrain specific human actions or can be strategi-
cally manipulated to bring about certain behaviour.4s On the whole, however, the physical world, 
in spite of the importance which Herodotus attributes to it, does not in itself yield an extensive 
category of what Herodotus explicitly labels as avaYJ(at: something that is beyond men's con-
trol and that causes them to suffer or do things independently of their will. 
Among the most frequent non-personal causes of compulsion in Thucydides are circum-
stances arising from strategies, policies or inter-city relations. Overcrowding in the city during 
the war, for example, forced the Athenians to occupy the Pelargikon (Thuc. 2.17 .1 ). The 
Mytileneans had been planning to secede from the Athenian League (this is a free choice), but 
leaks concerning their plot compelled them to act sooner than they had intended (Thuc. 3 .2.1-4). 
Frequently it is not only one thing that creates av<i'Y1C1l, but a complex of different factors or a 
concatenation of events some of which, though not all, were in tum inevitable and together end 
up creating an impasse at a certain point.49 Thus, the deteriorating relations between Corcyra and 
Corinth over Epidamnus compelled the Corcyreans to seek the alliance of Athens; subsequently 
Athenian ships supporting the Corcyreans at Sybota became perforce embroiled with the 
Corinthians.so This example illustrates how Thucydides' notion of ava'Y1C1l extends beyond the 
situation of someone who is left with no choice.51 A complication that further broadens 
Thucydides' application of avayKT\ terms is that external factors tend to be presented as com-
pelling because they are so perceived by those who experience them.52 
The issue of perception leads us to the important Thucydidean category of internal com-
pelling causes. These are essential needs (e.g. hunger), mental states, and set responses (fear, 
ambition, wrath, etc.) which result in psychological compulsion. The compulsion is here 'sub-
jective' to the extent that people find themselves in different positions at a given time, even 
though their impulses are predictable for everyone in the same circumstances because they are 
universally inherent in human nature. The pervasiveness and interrelation of these overlapping 
categories - external and internal non-manipulated avayJCat - are fundamental for our under-
standing of Thucydides' view of historical causality and, in particular, his statement about the 
inevitability of the Peloponnesian war: 
The truest cause, though the one least openly discussed, I believe was the fact that the Athenian power 
which was growing and which inspired fear in the Lacedaemonians made the war inevitable (avaYJCa-
crat f.t; to 1tOAEJ..LElV).53 
47 5.52.2, 5.52.4, 7 .31. On geographical and moral 
boundaries in Herodotus, see especially Lateiner 
1989.126-44. Necessity caused (to no one in particular) 
by some physical obstacle is occasionally expressed by 
xP'll (1.186.1, 8.129.2) or oe'i (2.29.2 and 3). 
48 See 2.152.4, already discussed (Ionians and 
Carians compelled to land in Egypt); 5.101.2 (Persians 
compelled by the fire of Sardis to fight on either side of 
the river Pactolus). The nature of the land and its fauna 
dictates the need with oe'i at 3.11 0. The manipulation of 
geographical ananke at 5.118.2 overlaps with personal 
ananke through strategy (above, n.32). 
49 Ostwald (1988) 15, 23. 
50 See Thuc. l.28.3*, 32.5*, 40.3*, 49.7, discussed by 
Ostwald (1988) 26-7. 
51 Cf de Ste. Croix (1972) 61. 
52 See Ostwald (1988) 24, 33 and esp. 16, where he 
discusses a typical example: 'Thucydides describes 
Cleon as compelled by a situation in which, to advocate 
the blockade of Sphacteria, he would either have to agree 
with reports he had denounced, or be proved a liar 
(IV.27.4). No doubt, objectively speaking, other courses 
of action would have been open to him, but none would 
have been free from risks made unadvisable for him to 
take in his public position'. 
53 Thuc. 1.23.6. Ostwald ( 1988) 1-5. This is also the 
judgement of Pericles and of the majority opinion in 
Athens (Thuc. 1.144.3*). Ostwald ( 1988) 40-1. Even in 
the absence of ava"{Kll terms, the Athenians' decision to 
accept an alliance with Corcyra (1.44.2) is based on the 
beliefthat a war against the Peloponnesians is in any case 
imminent (1.36*; cf 1.42*). On the other side, the neces-
sity of the Peloponnesian war is affirmed with aVUYJC- by 
the Corinthians (1.70.2* and 1.71.3*; 1.124.2*). 
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The Lacedaemonians' fear of Athens belongs to the order of psychological constraints to 
which all men would be subject under similar circumstances, just as the growth of Athenian 
power, at least according to the argument of the Athenians themselves elsewhere reported by 
Thucydides, has been in turn the result of universal internal motivations of the same type. 54 In 
these passages, psychological and political factors partake of the causal necessity postulated by 
the Hippocratics, so that Thucydides' approach to history, at least at this point in his work, is 'sci-
entific' and non-moralistic. Scientific, because in the sphere of human actions and events, as for 
natural phenomena or diseases, a certain combination of elements necessarily gives rise to deter-
minate results. Non-moralistic, because events, and in particular the outbreak of the 
Peloponnesian war or any war, are nobody's 'fault' .55 
States of mind are, on the other hand, entirely absent from the list of Herodotean avayx:m.56 
Universal features of human behaviour are also rarely identified as necessities. 57 But again, in 
Herodotus, most impersonal causes and motivations, both internal and external, including phys-
ical and strategic, are less insistently emphasized by the use of av&YKTI words than in 
Thucydides.5s Close to Thucydides' view of the force of complex and often unpredictable cir-
cumstances, however, is an interpretive gloss by which Herodotus underlines a change in the bal-
ance of power and the growth of states: the war of Athens against Aegina was the salvation of 
Greece because it forced the Athenians to become a naval power ( avayx:&cra~ 8aA-acrcriou~ 
yev£cr8m tou~ 'A&l)vaiou~, 7.144.1-2). Similarly, but without the typical Herodotean emphasis 
on the paradox of the reversal, the Syracusan Hermocrates in Thucydides says that the Athenians 
have become mariners because compelled by the Persian War ( avayx:acr8evta~ \mo t&v Mf,~olV, 
7.21.3), and the Thucydides-narrator himself echoes and completes this speaker's thought when 
he states that the Sicilians have acquired their navy because of the necessity of the Athenian inva-
sion (x:at' avaYKT~V ll~Tl tOU vaunx:ou 1tpocryeyEVTll.lEVOU, 8.2.3). 
54 Thuc. I. 75.3*. The Athenians add that if the 
Lacedaemonians had pursued the war against Persia they 
 would have been similarly compelled ( ava-yKacr6£vta~)
either to rule with a strong hand or put themselves in dan-
ger (1. 76.1 *). For other passages in Thucydides affirm-
ing the necessity of imperial expansion and other war ini-
tiatives, see 5.105.2* (Athenians to Melians); 6.87.2* 
(the Athenian Euphemus at Camarina). 
55 For av<i'}'lOl in the Hippocratics, see above, p.38 
and n.46. For the idea of the existence of universal moti-
vating human forces in Thucydides, see e.g. Archidamus' 
statement at 1.84.4*. Hornblower (1987) 76-77; 
Ostwald ( 1988) 30. On Thucydides' scientific stance, see 
Connor (1976). Thucydides' 'scientific' view of necessi-
ty is partially rooted in an older moralistic tradition; see 
e.g. Aesch. Ag. 218 and Williams (1993) 130-67. 
56 If we interpret Candaules' irrational love as the 
necessary cause of his bizarre behaviour and subsequent 
bad end, this is a unique application of XPtl to an emotion-
al factor (above, p. 34). Otherwise, aside from the hypo-
thetical 'must' at 1.129.4, 3.139.3*, 7.9.~2* and 3.80.4*, 
XPtl or oe"i are never used to express what one must 
absolutely do or obtain by virtue of one's state of mind. 
57 The biological need for people to relieve them-
selves is called ava-yKata at 2.35.3. The Persians say 
that no one ever kills his true father or mother, and in 
cases where that seems to have occurred an appropriate 
inquiry would necessarily reveal that the child was either 
a changeling or a bastard (1.137.2: notice the dogmatic 
use of ananke here, and cf above p.38 and n.46). They 
also believe that being in debt inevitably leads people to 
lie (1.138.1). A requirement of the human condition is 
expressed by XPtl at 7.50.2*; by oe"i at 5.4.2; and by 
oq>eiA.ro at 7.203.2. At 7.125 the UVU'}'lOl which deter-
mines a strange behaviour of lions appears more mysteri-
ous than biological or circumstantial (cf 7.225.2 and see 
Immerwahr (1966) 260 with his n.69). 
58 For external physical av<iylCil, see above pp.38-9. 
For external circumstances, see 7.229.2 (the behaviour of 
Eurytus makes the Spartan anger against Aristodemus 
inevitable); 6.95.2 (the fact that Naxos has not been cap-
tured forces Datis and Artaphernes to cross straight 
through the Aegean); 8.1 09.2* (fhemistocles generalizes 
that people who are 'driven to necessity' will recoup). 
For ananke produced by an opponent's strategy (obvious-
ly overlapping with personal ananke), see above, n.32. 
For strategy compelling one's own military actions, see 
9.15.2 (Mardonius cuts Theban trees because he is com-
pelled to build a palisade); XPtl and oe"i are more fre-
quently used of military or political requirements, though 
in the absence of an explicit cause, it is sometimes hard to 
distinguish between these and moral obligation, e.g. at 
9.16.4* (below, p.45). For xpf!, see also 1.123.2, 
4.118.4* (hypothetical), 5.49.8*, 5.50.2, 6.23.2, 6.43.3, 
6.84.2, 7.9~2*, 7.52.2*,7.172.2*, 8.3.1, 8.74.2, 9.25.2, 
9.26.3*, 9.41.2, 9.46.2* and 3*, 9.53.4 and 9.98.3* (both 
overlap with moral obligation), 9.54.2, 9.58.3*, 9.1 06.2 . 
For oei, see 1.91.4*, 3.45.3, 3.71.3*, 3.155.6*, 4.127.2*, 
5.31.4*, 6.88, 7.49.2*, 7.147.1, 7.172.2*, 8.68.2*, 
9.58.2*. For other cases where XPtl and oe"i express one's 
obligation to do what works best, see n.88. 
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The necessity of war 
Our discussion will now temporarily shift from the causes to the results of compulsion for the 
purpose of examining the following issue: if circumstances connected with war may force 
human action, as in Herodotus' and Thucydides' statements just cited, to what extent does 
Herodotus represent war itself as dictated by necessity, as in &.va.YK<icrm i:c; 'tO 1tOA£J.L£tV of 
Thucydides 1.23.6? In a lecture delivered over forty years ago, Amaldo Momigliano proposed 
that the reason why ancient historians tend to give unsatisfactory analyses of the profound caus-
es of specific wars is that they are culturally predisposed to view war in general as a permanent 
and inevitable fact of life. Momigliano included Thucydides in this assessment, in spite of his 
celebrated distinction between the immediate grievances that led to the Peloponnesian War and 
its truest cause: 'Thucydides is vague about the &.A.,Secr'ta'tll 1tpo<pa.crtc;. He is far superior to 
Herodotus in explaining the actual conduct of the war with which he is concerned, but he is much 
less convincing than Herodotus in discovering the remote origins of the war.' 59 
Whether we agree or not with Momigliano's comparative evaluation, it is true that 
Thucydides clearly states in his own voice that the Peloponnesian War, at least, was inevitable, 
and the speeches he reports indicate that many of his contemporaries shared this view. Other 
Thucydidean speakers refer to external or psychological &.vayKat which compel states to expand 
their rule or go to war against others.6o These passages reflect the frequency with which ideas 
of this sort permeated contemporary thought. They were occasionally invoked to justify 
Athenian imperialism as well as aggressive enterprises designed to check Athenian power. But 
when we tum to Herodotus, who according to Momigliano attributes greater importance to the 
specific causes of a war, we notice coincidentally that he also never says, or allows his charac-
ters to say, that initiating a war is the result of &.vaYKll. 
Is there such a thing, then, as a 'necessary war' for Herodotus? War is an evil but, as we have 
already seen, fighting is inevitable for people who, against their interests and inclinations, are 
compelled to do so by a ruler.6I Aside from this situation, various speakers in Herodotus suggest 
a distinction between voluntary and necessary war. Demaratus tells Xerxes that he would not 
fight with anyone of his own free will (£Krov 't£ dvm), but in case of necessity (d be &.va.YKCX.tll 
£111) he most certainly would want to rise to the greatest challenge (7 .1 04.3 *). The Athenians are 
subject to the 'necessity of evil' in the oracle we have already discussed, and this includes the 
war that Xerxes has brought. 62 After Salamis, they proclaim that to avenge the destruction of 
their temples and houses is a necessity ( &.va.YKa.iroc; £xn), so that they cannot come to terms with 
the invader even if they should want to do so (J.Lllb' ilv £8£A.roJ.L£V, 8.144.2*). All these contexts 
show that in Herodotus a compulsory war is a defensive war. 63 By contrast, Artabanus entreats 
Xerxes not to want (J.Lll ~ouA.eu) to expose himself to any such danger 'when there is no neces-
sity' (J.L11b£Jltll<; &.va.YKCX.tll<; i:o-60'11<;, 7.1 O.bl ).64 In Herodotus' Histories, an invasion or a war of 
aggression is an act of the will and an unnecessary choice. 
The only profitable aggressive action that is perpetrated under compulsion of any sort is that 
of Gyges, who is forced to choose between the murder of Candaules and his own death and 
chooses the first, thereby rising to power. The other despotic types in the Histories all make war 
59 Momigliano (1966) 117-18. 
60 See above, nn.53-4. 
61 See above, p. 36. War as a K<n:6v (in the narrator's 
own voice): 8.3.1, 6.98.2. 
62 7.140.3* (see above p. 32, interpretations 2 and 3). 
We recall that the less likely interpretation I would make 
this the only case in the Histories where initiating a war 
resulted from ava'Ylcrl. 
63 Thus, the Scythians if it becomes necessary (Oeot), 
will fight when the enemy attacks the graves of their 
ancestors (4.127.2-3*). Here the mention of the graves 
finds a parallel in the utterance of the Athenians to the 
Spartans at 8.144.2*, whereas the hypothetical clause is 
echoed by the words ofDemaratus to Xerxes at 7.1 04. 3* 
(doe UVU'"flCUlTJ ElTJ). The Scythian defensive nomos is 
a positive paradigm in the Histories (cf 4.46.2-3). 
64 This same expression is applied to Artemisia. 
Herodotus' evaluation of Artemisia is ambivalent; cf 
above p. 37, and below, p. 48. With oei, the need for war-
fare is put in doubt at 4.80.3*, 7.9.j32, 8.68.2* and 
7.10.91; murder is needless at 3.65.4*; at 7.144.2, t<; 
oeov means ' for the necessity of a defensive war'. 
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with motives that Thucydides would recognize (imperialism, desire for retaliation, fear, etc.) and 
for other reasons, but they are never 'forced' by any natural or human cause whatsoever -
whether by another person, by external circumstances or by psychological factors - to do what 
they do.6s Given the availability of av<iylcr\ and other 'must' words in contemporary language 
for talking about human behaviour, and if we consider the seemingly irresistible drive to conquer 
which Herodotus represents in one after the other of his historical agents, this absence is a mean-
ingful phenomenon. The narrative's choice of words does not encourage the recipient to think 
that the ruler, who almost by definition applies compulsion to others, is in his tum truly com-
pelled to do so. 
The role which Herodotus attributes, or declines to attribute, to the concept of necessity 
becomes clearer when we put side by side two passages in which Thucydides and Herodotus say 
similar things and share a common terminology, but the one uses av<iylcr\ words and the other 
does not. The subject of discussion is here precisely the causality of wars. In his painstaking 
analysis of the motives of Croesus' invasion of Cappadocia, Herodotus starts out by reporting 
that on account of 'the hegemony that Cyrus wrested away from Astyages and the growing 
power of the Persians ( ta t&v llepcr£rov 1tPTt'YJ.HX't<X m)~aVOJ!£V<X )', Croesus 'conceived the idea 
to bring down the growing power of the Persians (mh&v m)~aVOJ!EVllV tl,v OUV<XJ!tv), if he 
could, before they would become great (1tptv J!eya/..ouc; yev£cr8m, 1.46.1 )'. Later Herodotus 
gradually adds other psychological and external reasons why Croesus wished to attempt to 
destroy Persian power: confidence in the apparently favourable oracles (1. 71.1, 73.1), 'desire for 
more land, wanting to add to his share' ( 1. 73.1) and, lastly, a wish to avenge the defeat of his 
brother-in-law Astyages (1.73.1). Terms for wishing and planning abound, but no av<i'Ylcr\ sur-
faces. 
Herodotus' insistence on the growing power of the Persians give 1.46.1 away as a coded pas-
sage: its resemblance to Thucydides' gloss, that the growing power of Athens (touc; 'AS,vaiouc; 
... J!EYUAouc; ytyvoJ!evouc;) and the fear it inspired in the Spartans made war inevitable, is cer-
tainly significant.66 Here and elsewhere the two texts are engaged in a dialogue. Thucydides 
gives us a panorama of the various arguments that were being made in his time about current 
issues. Some of these he reports through his speakers while others he expresses directly, having 
appropriated them as his opinion (see ftyoUJ!<Xt at 1.23.6). Herodotus, who must have heard the 
same talk in public speeches, diplomatic exchanges, panhellenic gatherings and informal mar-
ket-place conversations all over Greece, applies its code to the narrative of earlier events. This 
is Herodotus' covert way of showing that historical evidence is relevant to current policies. The 
contemporary language brings out the similarity of past events, with known outcomes, to recent 
events whose future outcomes history gives the means to predict. 
Herodotus' accumulation of data for explaining the way in which things generally function 
would perhaps be of less practical value to his fellow-Greeks if it read into the past the idea that 
individuals and nations are driven by av<i'Ylcr\ to engage in aggressive or immoral behaviour. 
People under compulsion, as we have seen, are not entirely in control of their actions. 
Herodotus, unlike Thucydides, is in the business of investigating responsibility, and his work is 
a world-changing, other than world-describing, speech act. He praises, blames and accuses, and 
he informs for the purpose of warning and correcting, not merely the Athenians, but all the 
Greeks.67 This perhaps contributes to explaining the way in which Herodotus carefully controls 
65 Similarly, XPtl and oe'i are never used in these con-
texts. 
66 Raaflaub (1987) esp. 243, n.58, suggests that the 
similarity may constitute a pointer to more recent events 
and that the whole representation of Croesus by 
Herodotus (subjects Greeks to tribute, builds empire, 
attacks Cyrus out of fear for his growing power, relies on 
oracles) encapsulates characteristics that recall both 
Athens and Sparta on the eve of the Peloponnesian War. 
67 Nagy (1990) 228-43 and 250-72 discusses historie 
as juridical inquiry and documents Herodotus' role as 
arbitrator. Plutarch's De Herodoti malignitate testifies to 
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the proliferation of avaYJCil words even when he accepts other terms of the contemporary poli-
tical code that would tend to cluster in the same types of discourse. He excludes them in parti-
cular when reporting the motivations of monarchical rulers because these agents are his princi-
pal paradigms for incorrect public actions which all leaders and leading states are susceptible to 
undertaking but should, and can, avoid. 68 
The force of nomos 
Though Herodotus avoids applying avayKTJ terms to the impulse to wage war, the word xpe6v 
uniquely qualifies such an impulse in the difficult narrative of Xerxes' and Artabanus' dreams, 
where the mysterious vision denotes the campaign against Greece the king is contemplating as 
what is supposed to take place, 'tO xpeov yev£cr8at (7 .17 .2 *). We have already examined this 
case in our discussion of supernatural necessity, and the reason for reconsidering it here is that 
'tO xpe6v is likely to include a non-supernatural component and indicate 'what is supposed to 
happen' according to the predispositions of the parties involved. 69 This is true regardless of the 
ontological status of the dream, but it becomes especially conspicuous in view of Artabanus' ini-
tial suggestion that nightly visions merely replay a man's daytime preoccupations (7.16~2). 
Through this utterance the text opens the way to a psychological interpretation of the entire 
episode, which even the unexpected outcome of Xerxes' experiment and Artabanus' own con-
version to the idea of a supernatural dream fail to invalidate entirely. 
The non-supernatural component of the necessity that compels Xerxes is nomos. In the pre-
vious narrative of deliberations, Xerxes has demonstrated his concern to carry out the tradition-
al expansionistic policy of his father and earlier Persian kings. In his perception the alternative 
is either to increase his power or see it diminish, with no possible equilibrium or inactivity in 
between.?o This explains why the vision appears to Xerxes when he becomes inclined not to 
march against Greece, and why it threatens him saying that he will be reduced to insignificance.71 
Artabanus, for his part, has opposed the royal nomos of expansion by advising against the expe-
dition. He has also behaved irregularly in the course of the experiment by sitting on the royal 
throne and impersonating his master, something about which he expresses discomfort (7 .16.1 ). 
The vision that comes to Artabanus with threats of punishment and branding, therefore, embod-
ies the royal nomos from a subordinate's perspective: it reflects his deeply held cultural convic-
tions of what he 'should' do and of his proper station as a slave of the king.72 Thus, if we accept 
that 'tO xpe6v here points to a human cause why an agent 'must' start a war, the cause of the 
'must' is the force of nomos. 
a later ancient reader's awareness of the central role of 
blame directed against the Greeks in Herodotus. Among 
the sources mentioned on n.41 above, Fornara (1981) 
especially emphasizes Herodotus' deliberate silence con-
cerning recent events and his allusive form of discourse. 
Moles ( 1996) attributes to Herodotus the goal of 'warn-
ing the Athenians' . 
68 Our evidence does not, in other words, support the 
statements ofFornara (1971) 76-7 that ' the sad recogni-
tion of necessity for war is the message inherent in 
[Herodotus'] work', that 'Herodotus considered the 
events of his own time an unmitigated but thoroughly 
unavoidable disaster' , and that according to Herodotus 
'with human nature as it is, acts of injustice were 
inescapable' (all italics are mine). Some of these ideas 
may be perhaps more accurately attributed to Thucydides 
than to Herodotus. 
69 See above, p. 35. 
70 The connection between the Xerxes' dream and the 
royal nomos of expansion has been argued by Evans 
(1961). See also Evans (1965) 146. 
7! In the second apparition (7.14*). Cf 7.8.al-2*, 
11.2-3*, 7.50.3*. In the first apparition (7.12.2) the 
vision warns Xerxes against changing his mind since 
out£ 6 cruyyvOO<JoJlEvoc; tot 1tapa, 'there is no one here 
who will be forgiving'. And when Xerxes announces his 
change of mind to the Persians he starts out by saying 
(7.13.2): avopec; llepcrat, <JVYYWILT]V !lOt EX£t£ Ott 
ayx.tcrtpo<pa ~ovA.euown ( ' Persians, forgive me for 
going back on my decision'). The verbal correspondence 
indicates that Xerxes' preoccupation, reflected in the 
dream, includes the fear of the disapproval of his subjects 
(cf 3.134.1-2*). 
72 7.17-18. For high officials as royal 'slaves', see 
e.g. 8.1 02.3*. Branding connotes enslavement to the 
king at 7.233.2. 
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Nomos is indeed the only important category of internal psychological motives that 
Herodotus denotes with av<iyKTt words. 73 Of course, the av<iYKTl nomoi exercise does not, as in 
the case of Xerxes' royal nomos, have detrimental results. The difference is due to the fact that 
the ways in which kings go about honouring nomos, or the special nomoi of kings (including 
monarchy itself as a nomos) have special, negative, status in Herodotus; they often come into 
conflict with the normal way of things and with a people's traditional nomoi.74 The latter are 
instruments of order and, if followed, they have a salutary effect. 
'Av<iyKTt words are to be found applied to the obligations, prohibitions or penalties imposed 
by laws, oaths, treaties, kinship or traditional customs.7s Moral obligation- what we would call 
one's duty- is also grounded in nomos and similarly qualified or denoted by these terms. Thus, 
the av<iYKTl to fight to which Demaratus refers (7.104.3*) is imposed by the fact of an invasion, 
but is also related to moral obligation and to the nomos despotes he describes immediately below 
(7.104.4*).76 The word despotes attached to nomos is designed to recall that despots are by def-
inition agents of compulsion, but at Sparta nomos fulfils that role. The clV<XYJC<Xlll that eventual-
ly overcomes Prexaspes, who has so far lied to save his life, compels him to reveal the truth. 11 
Cured from his nomos-destructive madness in a brief moment before his death, Cambyses 
declares that it is his absolute obligation (yivttai J!Ol avayKmotatov) to exhort the Persian 
nobles to prevent the rule from reverting once more to the Medes (3.65.3*). 
Compulsion produces, as we have already seen, the opposite of a voluntary act.78 Yet, 
Spartans and Athenians respond to Xerxes' compulsion to either submit or fight a 'necessary' 
war by choosing to resist.79 Prexaspes both decides voluntarily (tKrov) to forget all the falsehoods 
he had been instructed to say, and at the same time declares himself obliged to be truthful 
(3. 7 5 .1-2). Gyges is compelled by a despotic agent either to kill or be killed, and the fact that 
73 Hohti (1975) also almost identifies the divine 
necessity expressed by the non-oracular XPTt and oei in 
the narrator's glosses anticipating doom (see above, p. 
34) with an immanent necessity deriving from the 'nomos 
king of all ' of 3.38.4. 
74 See e.g. 6.62.2 (the SpartanAgetus is compelled by 
his oath to give his wife to king Ariston), and especially 
3.31.4, 7.136.1 and 9.111.1, as well as the paradox of 
3.80.3* with 3.82.5*. 
75 In Egypt, daughters are obliged to support their 
parents (2.35.4, bis), it is obligatory to bury with special 
procedures anyone drowned in the river or killed by a 
crocodile (2.90.1 ), and to punish with death anyone who 
kills an ibis or a hawk (2.65.5). When a Spartan king 
dies, one man and a woman from every household are 
forced to put on mourning under penalty of a heavy fine 
(6.58.1) and perioikoi are compelled to attend the funeral 
(6.58.2). Croesus suggests that Cyrus confiscate the Sardis 
loot from the Persian soldiers saying that it is necessary a 
tithe be dedicated to Zeus (1.89.3*). Notice, however, 
that at 6.58.1 and 2 the compulsion is quasi-monarchic, 
and 1.89.3* describes a disguised case of monarchic 
compulsion. For oaths see 6.62.2 (above, preceding 
note). Alyattes and Cyaxares stipulate a marriage 
alliance in the belief that 'without strong necessity 
treaties do not last' (1.74.4, though the idea that family 
ties guarantee peace is undermined by the narrative at 
1. 75.1 ). For XPTt in reference to what one must do, or 
what must happen, according to law or custom, propriety 
or a rule, see 1.144.2, 1.196.3, 2.35.3, 2.173.2*, 2.179, 
5.111.4*; for oei, see 1.8.4*,1.31.2* (religious duty), 
1.42.2* (reinforced by o<peiMo), 1.67.5, 1.199.1 , 3.6.2, 
3.83.2* (vote of constitutional committee), 6.58.2 Uoined 
with avaM; see above in this note), 7.2.1. For the 
semantic difference between XPTt and oei specifically in 
relation to nomos, see Benardete (1965) 295. 
76 For moral obligation to fight a defensive war, see 
7.104.3* and 8.144.2* discussed above, p. 44. The ava:y-
K<ltTJ to resist against Xerxes that the Greeks attempted to 
impose on the Thessalians (7.172.3*) is presumably 
equivalent to moral pressure. Moral obligation, particu-
larly that of fighting well when on the battlefield, is com-
monly expressed by xpft: 1.37.2*, 1.41.3*, 3.52.4*, 
3.65.5*, 5.109.2* and 3*, 7.13.2*, 8.79.3*, 9.16.4*, 
9.17.4*, 9.45.3*, 9.53.4, 9.60.2*, 9.98.3*; for oei, see 
3.69.2*, 7.172.2*, 7.168.2, 7.51.2* (secondchoiceofthe 
lonians). The normal verb for the legal or moral obliga-
tion to repay a debt or a favour is o<pdMo, 1.42.2*, 
1.138.1, 3.52,1, 6.59, 5.82.1, 5.99.1 (the last two cases of 
such obligation lead to participation in war). 
77 3.75.2*. Truth telling is a Persian nomos (1.136.2, 
138.1). 
78 Above, p.41. For the lexical opposition of avaYKTI 
and will, see also the expression OUK EKOVt£~ aU' {m' 
UV<l'YJC<llTJ~ (7.139.3; 9.17.1). 
79 See words indicating the Athenians' choice at 
7.139.5 and 7.143.3, and the famous choice of Leonidas 
to fight at Thermopylae at 7.220. 
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he has at least this limited choice is singularly emphasized.8° By opting for the former course of 
action, he is almost the opposite of Prexaspes, wht> is forced by Cambyses to kill Smerdis and 
ends up killing himself as well. The wise Persians compelled to go along with Xerxes should 
warn the man in charge of the impending disaster (X,pE6v, 9.16.4*), but they resign themselves 
to a necessity of another sort and do not. Compelled to march against Greece, the Ionians must 
(8Et) either desert and behave as the justest of men or be the most unjust by fighting for the king 
against their fellow-Greeks (7.51.2*). All these cases indicate that to follow or not the dictates 
of morality entails an element of choice. They also show how Herodotus' narrative delineates 
an opposition between the constraint of law, custom or moral obligation on the one hand, and 
despotic compulsion on the other, so that frequently to accept the one means rejecting the' other.8I 
Similarly, Solon's fear that he may be compelled to abrogate his reforms ( 1.29 .1) illustrates the 
opposition between personal compulsion (and this time the compelling agent is potentially the 
Athenian demos) and positive law. 
Before moving on to the last category, it is appropriate to summarize how our initial questions 
on Herodotus' use of ava"fKTT words can be answered on the basis of the cumulative evidence 
presented so far. The lower frequency of ava"fKTT terms in Herodotus in comparison to 
Thucydides has something to do with Herodotus' moralistic outlook on causation. With regard 
to Herodotus' determinism, or lack of it, the most ambiguous area is one which has no equiva-
lent in Thucydides: divine necessity. Here ava"fKTT terms express mostly the god-willed neces-
sity of the negative consequences of immoral actions. Other terms of necessity in communica-
tions from gods to men, the utterances of various speakers, and the interpretive glosses of the 
narrator himself generally conform to the same pattern, though there are some cases - appropri-
ately enough when gods are in view - where ambiguity prevails. 
When ava"fKTT terms, with the subsidiary XPll /8Et, are applied to natural causes, the compar-
ison with Thucydides becomes more meaningful. Whether the narrator or the characters are 
speaking, the text of Thucydides is prodigal, and that of Herodotus is sparing of terms that may 
possibly suggest that people have no choice but to take certain actions (especially unjust actions) 
in the face of laws of nature, external circumstances, issues of basic survival, and psychological 
factors. Even those on the receiving end of monarchic compulsion are, in an absolute sense, free 
to avoid, disregard or resist it. Some of them choose to do so, sometimes at the risk of their lives, 
and sometimes by answering to the higher compulsion of moral obligation and nomos. 
This view of 'necessity' reveals Herodotus' unwillingness to represent certain political 
events, such as war, empire and the aggressions that accompany the growth of states, as 
inevitable natural phenomena the way Thucydides appears to do. It confirms Herodotus' ten-
dency to evaluate actions from an ethical perspective and his self-imposed task not just to report, 
but to praise and to blame, and to treat his research of aitiai, causes, as a juridical inquiry into 
who is aitios. Herodotus' use of the stem avayx:- (and XPll /8Et) is also consistent with the high 
value the Histories elsewhere attribute to the social order established through nomos on the one 
hand and collective or individual political freedom on the other. The last category ofHerodotean 
passages where we find ava"fKTT words belongs, as we have mentioned at the beginning of this 
paper, to a different level of discourse, that at which the narrator talks about his act of narrating. 
It represents, however, a related phenomenon, and an index of the narrator's personal involve-
ment in the principles which the preceding analysis has revealed. 
80 Gyges says that he is being compelled to kill 
Candaules (1 .11.4*), but the queen and the narrator both 
apply O.vaYK- ( 1.11.3) and oe\ ( 1.11.2*, 1.12.1) to the 
choice he 'wants' to make (a\pecrtv, OJCOtEpT)v ~oui.wt 
tpa7tecr9at, 1.11 .2*; OtaKptvat totau'tT)v atpecrtv; 
a\.peetat auto<; ltEptEtVat, 1.11.4 ). Gyges also forgoes 
moral obligation when he agrees to violate one of the old 
principles 'from which one must (od) learn' (1.8.4*) and 
sees what he should not have (!lfl ... oe\, 1.11.2*). 
81 Cf above, p. 44 with n.74. 
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The compulsion of the logos 
In Herodotus avayK- stems occur five times in the passive voice within metanarrative state-
ments, applied to the narrator himself. In all these cases ava"flCTl is a compulsion 'to say' some-
thing, and its cause is something akin to nomos: the rules that apply to the narrator in the fulfil-
ment of his task. 
(I) I will mention 'divine things' only when absolutely compelled (£~avayKa~OJlEVoc;) by the 
logos (2.3.2). 
(2) The things I have touched upon concerning divine matters, I have said seized by necessi-
ty ( avayK<XtT\\ KataAaJl~aVOJlEVoc;, 2.65.2). 
(3) I make no mention of the local leaders in Xerxes' army because I am not constrained by 
necessity (ou yap avayK<XtT\\ E~Ep"(OJl<Xt, 7.96.1). 
( 4) I make no mention of the other taxiarchs in Xerxes' fleet on the grounds that I am not com-
pelled (roc; OUlC avayKa~OJlEVoc;, 7.99.1). 
(5) At this point I am held by necessity (avayKatT\t £~£pyoJ.Lat) to display an opinion odious 
to most men, but nevertheless since it seems to me to be true, I will not hold back 
(7.139.1). 
Self-referential avayK- as in the statements just quoted is entirely absent in Thucydides, 
though it can be found within intradiegetic utterances in oratio recta both in Herodotus and 
Thucydides. In a speech in which the Athenians at Sparta defend their right to the empire, they 
say that at the cost of causing annoyance, it is necessary for them to remind the listeners of the 
role the Athenians in the Persian Wars (Thuc. 1.73 .2*). This is a case of what we may call 
'rhetorical ananke', when the speaker claims that the present occasion, or an argument that others 
have just put forth (as here the Corinthians), makes it imperative for the sake of the effectiveness 
of his speech that he cover certain topics. In a Herodotean speech which bears many resemblances 
to the one just cited in Thucydides, the Athenians at Plataea state that, since the Tegeans have been 
recounting their past deeds, it is necessary (avayKairoc; exn) that the Athenians also demonstrate 
on what grounds they are entitled to occupy the right wing of the army.82 
In cases when saying certain things is the right and fair thing to do, and perhaps entails cer-
tain risks for the speaker, 'rhetorical' ava"flCTl is identical with the moral obligation to speak out. 
Thus at the point when Artabanus says that 'since there are many issues at stake, it is necessary 
to prolong the discussion', he is mainly concerned that his strategic advice to Xerxes be effec-
tive by covering all the bases (7 .51.1 *). The exhortation of Cambyses on his death-bed, how-
ever, and the revelation made by Prexaspes before he hurls himself from the tower are rendered 
compulsory by a sense of duty toward their audiences.83 In the case of Demaratus, as long as 
Xerxes compels him to speak at all (monarchic compulsion), he evidently feels compelled to 
speak the truth (moral obligation).84 
It is in this context that we should consider the five Herodotean programmatic statements 
quoted above. The first two refer to the same obligation to discuss divine matters in the Egyptian 
ethnography. This obligation is 'rhetorical'- exercised by the logos (2.3.2)- but worded in 
terms that suggest that it is an unwelcome duty and that the desire to make the opposite choice 
is exceptionally strong.8s This sort of material is to some extent repulsive to the narrator him-
82 9.27.1 *. This speech is designed anachronistically 
to illustrate themes of fifth-century hegemonic oratory; 
hence its resemblance to Thucydides' Athenian speech at 
the Spartan congress, which in turn reports ta deonta, i.e. 
typically incorporates those themes (above, n.2). See 
Loraux (1986) 74-5 and 89; Raaflaub (1987) 239. 
83 3.65.6*, 75.2. See above, p. 44. 
84 7.101.3*, 7.104.1*, 7.104.5*. Cf Croesus com-
pelled to speak by Cyrus ( 1.86.4). See Hohti (1974). 
85 The compound e~ava'YJ(a1.;etv occurs only at 2.3.2. 
On the opposite side we have in each case an expression 
of 'not wanting' : 'I am not eager (1tp69u!Loc;) to recount 
in detail' (2.3.2), 'I very much avoid (q>ruyoo !LciAtcrm) 
explaining' (2.65.2). At 2.46.2, the narrator says that 'it 
is not too pleasant (ou ... tjotov) for me to tell', and at 
2.47.2 that a certain myth is 'not decent enough' (o\nc 
e\mpe1tecr-repoc;) for him to report. In another, and per-
haps different, set of cases, the narrator's silence on reli-
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self.&6 By including it he risks exposing a foreign religion as shocking or absurd to the very audi-
ence to whom he wants to demonstrate, among other things, that 'men's knowledge about the 
divine is equivalent all over the world'. &7 Universal respect for nomos competes with the logos, 
and the second compels the narrator to explain Egyptian piety, cult and culture to the farthest lim-
its that are set by the former. This is what we may call the nomos of the logos.88 But the logos 
is Herodotus' own, and the compulsion it exercises represents both an obligation and a free 
choice.s9 
The requirements of Herodotus' 'story', which must be complete and exact and also provide 
useful information, are presumably the point of statements 3 and 4, which have similar referents. 
Here, however, passive &..va'(K- appears in the negative, and the narrator's shrug with respect to 
what he is not obliged to do suggests a polarity with the surrounding context. At 7.96.1, thenar-
rator is free, whereas the agents of his immediate narrative are slaves: 
I make no mention of the local leaders in Xerxes' army because I am not held by necessity ( ou yap 
avaYJCaillt £~epyof.Lat) for the sake of the narrative that derives from my research ( E<; i.cr1:opi11<; A6yov ). 
For the leaders of each ethnic group were not noteworthy, and moreover within each ethnic contingent 
there were as many leaders as there were cities represented. They followed not as commanders, but 
only as slaves, like the others who were subject to command in this expedition ... 
Herodotus' historie may well have uncovered the leaders' names, but their subjection to 
monarchical rule makes them in some sense 'not worthy' ofthe logos of Herodotus, who in tum 
is subject to no one, only bound to the obligations entailed by the logos itself.9o Similarly, the 
gious matters is motivated by the fact that speaking open-
ly of such things is 'not holy' (see especially 2.61.1, 
2.86.2). All of Herodotus' avowals of silence in Book 2 
are cited by Linforth ( 1924), esp. 280, and (1928) 240. 
For all expressions of reticence in Herodotus, see 
Lateiner (1989) 73-5. 
86 The theriomorphic aspects of Egyptian religion 
were repulsive to the Greeks: Lloyd (1976) 293-4. 
87 2.3.2. For the scholarly controversy over this pas-
sage and relative bibliography, see Lloyd (1976) ad loc. 
Linforth (1924), esp. 276-80, and (1928) 201-7. 
88 The requirement of the logos, here signified by an 
avaYJC- stem, is also expressed in Herodotus' metanarra-
tive with the verb Ot~TJI.L<Xl, 'seek out': 'from the begin-
ning has my logos been seeking out these additions' 
( 4.30.1 ); and £moi~T]f.l<Xt: 'at this point my logos seeks 
out who is Cyrus ... ' (1.95.1). See also ef.!Oi... ll1t01CEl1:at: 
'it is incumbent upon me in my entire logos that I write 
what I hear is being said by each source' (2 .123. 1); and 
oq>dAro, twice at 7.152.3: 'I ought to say what is being 
said, but I am not obliged to believe it'. See Dewald 
( 1987) on these and other first person interventions by the 
narrator; also Fowler (1996), esp. 69, 76. References to 
the requirements of the logos are comparable to what we 
may call the 'must of proper procedure' with XP~ and Oet, 
a category which, like rhetorical necessity, is akin to that 
of strategy: what we must do in order to be successful at 
whatever our current project is. The verb Oet appears fre-
quently in programmatic statements that proclaim the 
need to include evidence or to pursue certain topics, but 
it bears less emphasis than aV<XYJC- and the other terms we 
have mentioned (see e.g. 1.179.1: 'And yes, I must still 
explain, in addition to those other things, where the dirt 
from the ditch was utilized and in which way the wall 
was built'). It suggests (Dewald (1987) 165), 'a sense of 
strain inherent in the problem of composition'. Cf e.g. 
5.54.1, 5.62.1, 5.67.3. Statements on how we should 
evaluate sources or available evidence, with Oe'i or 
xp~/xpeov occur at 1.57.1 and 2 ('if one must deduce 
what language the Pelasgians spoke from the existing 
Pelasgians'), 2.120.3 ('if it is necessary to believe these 
epic poets .. .'); 7.214.2 ('we should base our judgement 
on the fact that the pylagoroi put a price not on the head 
of Onetes or Corydallos, but on that of Ephialtes'); on 
whether the narrator has the right to draw certain conclu-
sions at 9.65.2 ('if it is necessary to have an opinion 
about divine matters ... '). In the narrative, characters the-
orize on the right way to acquire information ('it would 
have been necessary for Croesus to inquire further whose 
empire the oracle meant', 1.91.4*), make evaluations ('it 
is necessary to look at the end of everything', 1.32.9*), 
assess historical precedent ('if we must judge from the 
things that were done by those Greeks who burned Sardis 
and marched against Asia' , 7.11.2*), and comment on the 
appropriateness of making certain arguments ('we know 
that the Persian power is much greater than ours, so there 
is no need for you to throw this in our face', 8.143.1 *). 
See the discussion of so-called procedural XP~ in other 
authors by Benardete 1965 (289), and cf Craik (1998) 18 
on XP~ and Oe'i in Hippocratic prescriptions. 
89 Cf the voluntary aspect of moral obligation, above, 
pp.44-5. 
90 If we accept the conjectural reading ou1:e ... e1ta~tot 
('not...noteworthy'), the adjective may imply a moral 
judgement of these monarchic slaves (' not... worthy'); it 
occurs only one other time, positively referred to VOIJ.lf.l<X 
(2.79.1). 
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other statement (7.99.1) creates a word-play between two avayte- stems in the passive negative, 
one referring to the narrator and one to an agent:9I 
I make no mention of the other taxiarchs in Xerxes' fleet on the grounds that I am not compelled ( ro~ 
ouK ava"((Ca~61ltvo~), except for Artemisia, whom I consider a great wonder, a woman marching 
against Greece, who held the rule after the death of her husband and, though she had a young son, made 
the expedition out of sheer courage and manliness, there being no compulsion upon her to do so 
( ouO£fltll~ oi EOUcrTJ~ av<X"((C<Xtll~). 
In simplified terms, the combination of7.96.1 with 7.99.1, which follow each other at close 
range, yields the sequence: I am not compelled to mention other commanders who were slaves 
(i.e. under compulsion), but [I am compelled to/will mention] Artemisia whom I consider a 
thoma and who was not under compulsion. Antithetical to those other foreign subjects of 
Xerxes, the free narrator (the prominent f.yro of 7 .96.1) is analogous to Artemisia, insofar as both 
of them are immune from external compulsion.92 
The last of the metanarrative statements where the narrator applies avayte- to himself throws 
some light on this insistent parallel between Herodotus and his characters in relation to issues of 
constraint. Here the obligation dictated by the logos does not so much create a theoretical oppo-
sition between the autonomous Greek histor and the foreign subjects of a king, as it counters 
something analogous to monarchic constraint: a real and immediate political intimidation that 
comes from within Greece and outside the text (7.139.1). 
At this point I am compelled by necessity publicly to display an opinion that most people will resent, 
but still, since it appears to me to be something true, I shall not hold back (ev9a\ha ava"((C<Xtllt e~£pyo­
fl<Xt yYcOflllV cX1tOOE~aaem E1ttcp9ovov 1tpo~ t&v 1tA£0V(l)V av9pc01t(l)V . Ofl(l)~ 8£, tilt y£ flOl q><XtV£t<Xt 
dvm cXAlle£~. OUK emaxi]aro). 
This statement emphatically announces an interpretive gloss which, in a fugue of contrary-to-fact 
past conditions, sketches the scenario of what would have been the case, had the Athenians cho-
sen not to oppose Xerxes on the sea.93 The Peloponnesian allies would have surrendered, not of 
their own free will, but out of compulsion (ouK EKOV't(l)V a'A'A' im' avayte<ltfl<;); the Spartans 
alone would have resisted, perhaps, but they would all have died after performing great deeds 
(artooe~nJlEVOt epya JlEya'Aa, 7.139.3). As for the wall across the Isthmus, even many layers of 
walls (139.3), 'I cannot figure out' what use that would have been. 
As the narrator provides an assessment of who played what role in 480, he does so in terms 
so defensive and personal that the topic suddenly emerges as a current and controversial concern. 
The opinion that the Athenians were then the saviours of Greece (139.5) is the narrator's own 
almost heroic performance (see yYWJlflV artoo£~acr9m at 139.1). Again, implicitly contrasted 
with monarchic compulsion, the avayteaill of Herodotus' logos must this time override cp96voc;, 
the resentment of the public, which will target the researcher/narrator displaying an opinion 
91 The significance of such verbal correspondences 
between the narrator and the referents of the Histories has 
been noticed, for example, in the case a1tooe~tc;/ 
a1tOOEl1CVU~at, the first applied in the first sentence to 
Herodotus' historie and the second to the achievements 
he is going to recount (epya ... a1tol>ex8ev1:a). In the rest 
of the Histories, a1toOEiKVu~at recurs with the meaning 
of performing deeds and displaying opinions, both in nar-
rative and metanarrative in the latter sense, as we shall 
see below in the case of7.139.1. Erbse (1956) 209-11. 
Nagy ( 1990) 220-1. 
92 Artemisia is a paradox: at a different level she is 
herself, of course, a 1:upavvoc; who wages war 'without 
compulsion/necessity', as monarchs are wont to do (see 
above, n.63). Munson (1988). The self-referential aspect 
of some of Herodotus' characters has been taken for 
granted in some cases (e.g. Solon), and more subtly 
explored in others; see, for example, Benardete (1969) 
14-16 on Arion and especially Christ (1994) on king-
researchers. 
93 7.139.1-5. See Demand (1987) for the rhetorical 
aspect of this passage. 
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e1ti<p8ovo~ to most men. The reason for the compulsion is here expressed in ethical terms. It is 
the narrator's moral duty to keep the record straight, not to yield to the temptation of revising 
history, but preserve what seems to him according to evidence (!lOt <pa.ivet<n) the truthful 
account of the past ( <lA.,e£~, cf taA.118£o~ at 139.5), regardless of the distasteful uses to which 
it is now being put.94 
Through the metanarrative use of the stem ava.yK-, the narrator of the Histories clearly rep-
resents himself as analogous to the most admirable of his characters on the receiving end of com-
pulsion. He is, like Artemisia, a free agent, and the opposite of an imperial subject, able to dis-
regard political pressure, or face it and fight it, no matter what side it may come from. Like 
Prexaspes and Demaratus, he is compelled by nomos despotes, which in his case means the rules 
that apply to him as researcher, recorder, adviser to his audience, corrector of their prejudices, 
and arbitrator of their differences. Herodotus' obligations include adequate instruction of his 
audience, relevancy, fairness and a non-partisan respect for truth. 
ROSARIA VIGNOLO MUNSON 
Swarthmore College 
94 On the basis of other evidence in the Histories we 
cannot agree with Evans ( 1969) that, just because 
Herodotus is here verifying a version of events that had 
become in his time a 'propaganda weapon' (cf Thuc. 
l. 73-75*), he is also expressing sympathy with the aims 
of the propaganda. 'tf\t y£ J.l.Ot bespeaks reluctance (the 
same sort of unwillingness to say something offensive is 
evidenced by the incidental programmatic gloss at 
8.73.3). The vocabulary of 'truth' is here conjoined with 
that of opinion, yet this is Herodotus' most unambiguous 
declaration of truth in terms of aletheie ever. See Darbo-
Peschanski (1987) 164-89, and esp. 165-7. 
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